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Introduction 
Philosophy dies if we interrupt  
its millennial dialogue with the sciences. 
Paul Ricœur 
Considered as a whole, Ricœur’s work is surely one of the most eloquent examples of 
contemporary philosophical thought, for which philosophy cannot be self-sufficient. 
This thesis cannot be overstated because it lies at the very heart of the Ricœurian 
philosophical conception: philosophy needs its other for the task that it is up to it to perform. 
In Ricœur, then, the non-philosophical occupies an important place both as field of the pre-
philosophical interrogation of meaning (whether it is a matter of listening to real-life experience, 
the symbolic, the mythical or even questioning faith) and as an area of specialized and 
interdisciplinary research. We can say that in this sense, in its most diverse deployments, 
Ricœur’s work accords a radical primacy to theoretical alterity, and develops it in a constant 
struggle against every kind of “philosophical narcissism” and attachment to Hegelianism. For 
Ricœur, philosophy is now incapable of forming a system: its “route” is a “long” route, which is 
neither circular nor progressive. It must traverse the various fields of knowledge following a line 
of research and dialogue that becomes more and more difficult, because it never confines itself to 
a purely theoretical or speculative approach. Today more than ever, one can thus say that 
“philosophy dies if we interrupt its millennial dialogue with the sciences, whether it is a question 
of the mathematical sciences, the natural sciences or the human sciences.”1 
In our judgement, it is from this perspective that Freud and Philosophy is particularly 
interesting. The echoes of Ricœur’s lecture at Bonneval (1960), whose content foreshadowed the 
fundamental guidelines of the great work of 1965, still reverberate today to a surprising extent: 
after all, what brings a philosopher trained in phenomenology, existential philosophy, the revival 
of Hegelian studies and the search for linguistic trends to this fruitful encounter with 
psychoanalysis? Ricœur’s response is that the Freudian discovery of the unconscious “affects and 
questions anew not simply some particular theme within philosophical reflection but the 
philosophical project as a whole.”2 
Reason’s diplomat, reflection’s analyst, Ricœur never feared the frank and honest debate 
with psychoanalysis, also showing that he has closely followed the “never forgotten precept” that 
another important expert on Freudianism and his first master, Roland Dalbiez, had taught him: 
“never go round the obstacle, but face it head-on.”3 The search for the reflexive challenge and the 
dialectic between different perspectives and interpretations is at the very heart of his 
philosophical project: always ready to face any challenge or any conflict, Ricœurian thought turns 
out to be as rigorous and methodologically precise, on the one hand, as it is circuitous and 
creative, on the other. 
As regards psychoanalysis, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation certainly 
represents the most obvious, but not the only, sign of this type of confrontation and of this 
tensional, dialectical and adversarial method. Here, Ricœurian thought embarks on “a reflection 
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adventure” whose final philosophical reward is nothing other than that of a “wounded, broken 
cogito […]” This lesson can serve, especially after Freud and Philosophy, as a safeguard against 
every narcissistic pretension of philosophy. 
Surely, this critique is directed not only at philosophy, but it also opposes a certain 
narcissism of French psychoanalysis, notably on its Lacanian side, which confined itself to a 
reading of the Ricœurian interpretation of Freud that was as unjust as it was superficial.  
Today, however, there is a half century between us and those hostile reactions to the 
publication of the French original of Freud and Philosophy, and perhaps we can claim at least part 
of the “present and future legacy” of Freud and Philosophy – just as Ricœur maintained that it 
should be possible to update the legacy of the “masters of suspicion”: Marx, Nietzsche, and 
Freud.4 That is to say, a lot of time has passed and, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of 
the publication of Freud and Philosophy, something in our understanding of the Ricœurian 
interpretation of Freud has changed. Are we now able to extract the positive lessons from this 
work, detaching ourselves from the negative interpretation of the 1960s, which resulted in the 
inherently limited preconceptions of the day? It is still too early to tell. However, as evidenced by 
this issue of Études Ricœuriennes/Ricœur Studies as well as much recent research on the Ricœurian 
reading of Freud, the routes to a positive reappropriation of the work are now open. 
Because “one is never too old to learn,”5 now more than ever, it is surely time to press on 
with the reflection, in the style of Ricoeurian thought. In other words, it is time to analyze and 
evaluate, in a new light, the relationship between Ricœur and psychoanalysis, either from the 
point of view of philosophical research stricto sensu or from the point of view of the theoretical 
and therapeutic research of contemporary psychoanalysis and psychiatry. As is evident from the 
articles that have been brought together in this issue, it is a question of a relationship that goes 
well beyond Freud and Philosophy, without renouncing its core theses.  
If, on the one hand, Freud has always been, for Ricœur, an essential point of reference in 
relation to psychoanalysis – and we can say the same thing about all the experts that 
problematized and examined the possibility of a hermeneutic reinterpretation of psychoanalysis 
(Lorenzer, Habermas, George S. Klein et al.) – on the other hand, the theoretical and clinical 
vocabulary of dynamic psychology is still, to this day, directly or indirectly characterized by 
Freud’s lesson and by a space of hermeneutic and epistemological problematization. 
If therapies have now become broadly diversified, the legacy of psychoanalysis 
nevertheless remains – directly or indirectly – significant: whether it is in theoretical and technical 
or practical and clinical research, in connection with the (speculative/metapsychological) 
development of models of mental life, in connection with the problem of the interpretation of 
internal conflicts and conduct disorders, or even in the understanding of certain mental 
functions, conscious or unconscious. De facto, mental suffering due to mental disorders always 
has a deep connection with the sphere of the signified. That is why the interpretation of symbols 
and of the meaning of suffering cannot be reduced to the sphere of existential or intellectual 
questioning, or even to the dimensions of scientific theory, with its endless questioning around 
the epistemological status of the human sciences. 
To date, the theoretical-reflexive dialectic between psychoanalysis and philosophy has 
been particularly productive for both disciplines. There have been times when philosophy 
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appealed to psychoanalysis in order to sort out some of its hermeneutic and explanatory 
difficulties, and psychoanalysis has done the same with philosophy for reasons that were similar 
in some respects yet different in others. 
In this respect, Paul Ricœur’s work is a contribution of great significance, which goes 
well beyond the hermeneutic turn (in psychoanalysis) of the 1970s and 1980s, and which also 
goes well beyond the theoretical and speculative contribution made by Freud and Philosophy 
([French original] 1965) and The Conflict of Interpretations ([French original] 1969). His research 
around psychoanalysis – which was developed throughout his life, and whose most recent 
offerings have been brought together by Jean-Louis Schlegel6 in Paul Ricœur, Écrits et conférences 
1. Autour de la psychanalyse – is concerned with and analyses a wide variety of areas: from 
psychoanalysis to philosophical anthropology, from the hermeneutics of symbols to narrative 
hermeneutics, from symbolism to aesthetics, from the philosophy of culture and the philosophy 
of religion to epistemology, from the philosophy of language and the philosophy of action to the 
hermeneutics of translation, from the philosophy of history to ethics, from the philosophy of 
science to the theory of recognition, and from the neurosciences to the philosophy of mind. 
Among these different research topics, it is certainly the thematic of philosophical anthropology, 
with its focus on the intersubjective and inter-relational dimension and its idea of the narrative 
constitution of personal identity, which has enabled and encouraged the extraordinary progress of 
theoretical, speculative and therapeutic research on these themes. 
Fifty years after the publication of Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (1965-
2015), Vol. 7 n° 1, 2016 of ERRS attempts, then, to initiate a discussion on current assessments of 
the implications of Ricœur’s research around psychoanalysis by analysing current trends and 
debates concerning Ricœurian thought and contemporary philosophy as well as theoretical and 
clinical developments that have occurred in psychoanalysis. 
In this regard, we are very pleased to begin this issue of ERRS with the philosopher’s last 
interview on hermeneutics and psychoanalysis. It is, therefore, Ricœur’s own words that the 
reader will find, in “Psychanalyse et interprétation. Un retour critique,” at the beginning of this 
edition. Recorded in 2003 by the Italian psychoanalyst Giuseppe Martini, the interview proposes 
not only a “critical return” to various sensitive nodes of the Ricœurian interpretation of 
psychoanalysis, but also (thanks to Martini’s well-directed questions) a certain update concerning 
what may be called the “new” theoretical-practical advancements in Ricœur’s reflection on 
psychoanalysis. Published here in a bilingual version (French-English) – thanks to Stephanie 
Arel’s English translation – the interview, which until only just recently was available only in 
Italian, is preceded by a brief overview by Weiny Freitas et Alberto Romele, whose purpose is to 
clarify the historical context of the various editions and the circumstances surrounding the 
introduction of the current version. 
”Psychanalyse et interprétation. Un retour critique” is followed by a text written by 
Giuseppe Martini entitled: “Entretien sur la psychanalyse: réflexions en marge.” Here it is 
Ricœur’s interviewer himself who, over ten years later, looks back on the interview that he 
recorded with the philosopher, contextualizing it in terms of the circumstances in which the 
interview took place and the period of psychoanalytic history into which it fits, and reflecting on 
its most important implications, namely, the unrepresentable and the untranslatable in 
psychoanalysis. 
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We find the same general mood of historical analysis characteristic of Martini’s approach 
in Vinicio Busacchi’s article: “Lacan’s Epistemic Role in Ricœur’s Re-reading of Freud.” After 
giving the historical background on the philosophical reception of psychoanalysis in France, the 
author reconsiders the epistemological role that Lacan played in the Ricœurian interpretation of 
Freud. To this end he uses unpublished documents from the archives of the Fonds Ricœur in 
order to demonstrate that, in the “Dialectic” part of the work, the conceptual difference between 
structuralism and hermeneutics is more subtle and more tenuous than one is generally willing to 
admit. 
Against Busacchi, Marie-Lou Lery-Lachaume finds that there is a greater distance 
between Ricœur and Lacan at the level of theory. In her article entitled, “Ricœur, Lacan, et le défi 
de l’inconscient. Entre constitution herméneutique et responsabilité éthique,” the author also 
offers a historical reflection, looking back on the Bonneval colloquium on the unconscious which 
took place in October 1960, and on the French “violent reception” of Freud and Philosophy. 
However, her main contribution lies precisely in an analysis of the decisive implications of 
Ricœur’s and Lacan’s differing opinions on the psychoanalytic clinic. 
It is precisely on that same question of the clinic that Eoin Carney’s article, “Technique 
and Understanding: Paul Ricœur on Freud and the Analytic Experience,” focuses. However, the 
author views the problem of analytic experience from a perspective that differs from that of the 
preceding article; he examines it from the point of view of its technical nature. In this text, his 
objective is to compare the technē dimension of clinical practice with the experience of 
understanding, which that same practice also provides. 
Without exiting the clinical field, but entering into an epistemological discussion, 
Gregory A. Trotter’s article, “The Debate between Grünbaum and Ricœur: The Hermeneutic 
Conception of Psychoanalysis and the Drive for Scientific Legitimacy,” is essentially a critique of 
Grünbaum’s conception of the scientific status of psychoanalysis and a rather sober eulogy for 
Ricœur’s Freudianism. It is on this theme of language that the author focuses most of his 
argument. This is the case both with regard the critique and with regard the eulogy. 
Along similar lines, Philippe Lacour continues the epistemological debate with 
Grünbaum, but this time the focus is on the Ricœurian concepts of “motivation” and “causality.” 
In his article, “Adolf Grünbaum, critique de Ricœur,” the author emphasizes the specific 
characteristics of “the new theory of motivation and causality,” developed in Freud and 
Philosophy, so that he can then proceed to provide a rigorous response to the general critique, 
which the American philosopher addressed to his French counterpart. What we have here is 
actually “Ricœur, a critic of Grünbaum,” and this virtual debate led by the author ultimately 
sheds light on the specific characteristics of psychoanalytic hermeneutics as well as the status of 
psychoanalytic knowledge. 
Lastly, in Rudolf Boutet’s article, “Temps et psychanalyse chez Ricœur. Confrontation de 
deux perspectives sur le passé,” the reader will find a reflection on the Ricœurian philosophy of 
time in its relations with a certain reading of Freudian psychoanalysis. The author compares the 
“past always open to the future” of Time and Narrative with “the blocked past” that is thematized 
by psychoanalysis – a past that haunts the present in the form of the compulsion to repeat. By 
doing so, he demonstrates both the importance of Freud for Ricœur’s whole philosophy of time 
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and the practical significance of the Ricœurian idea of the indeterminate past for the problem 
posed by the obsessive fear of the past. 
As guest editors, we would like to express our sincere appreciation to Eileen Brennan 
and Jean-Luc Amalric, editorial directors of Études Ricœuriennes/Ricœur Studies, for the remarkable 
level of support that they provided throughout the development of this issue. We also thank the 
reviewers for their attentive, precise, and competent work as well as all the authors who 
responded to our call for proposals. Finally, particular thanks are due to Professor Luiz Monzani, 
who also contributed to this editorial work. 
Vinicio Busacchi and Weiny César Freitas Pinto 
Translated by Eileen Brennan 
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